One senior member of the syndicate allegedly orchestrated a disinformation campaign. This involved fabrication of a terror attack, a false narrative aimed at perverting the course of justice and diverting law enforcement resources.
At a time when controlling the narrative is power, are organised crime groups acting as mercenaries of disinformation, using their skills to manipulate minds for profit? A recent Australian Federal Police (AFP) operation suggests an intersection is forming between crime, disinformation and technological exploitation.
In September, the AFP arrested six members of a Sydney-based criminal syndicate implicated in drug importation as part of Operation Kraken. The operation targeted Ghost, an encrypted messaging app designed for illicit communications. It played a crucial role in the syndicate’s activities, used to send more than 125,000 criminal messages.
What makes this case particularly interesting is that one senior member of the syndicate allegedly orchestrated a disinformation campaign. This involved fabrication of a terror attack, a false narrative aimed at perverting the course of justice and diverting law enforcement resources.
Services on subscription
Criminal groups are known to exploit social and technological developments for profit. Cybercriminals in Europe are already engaging in disinformation as a service for customers. AFP and criminal intelligence organisations should be wary of that happening in Australia.
Further, criminal organisations are now selling services to both state and non-state actors. In Myanmar, for instance, ethnic armed groups have increasingly relied on drug production to finance their operations.
By partnering with organised crime syndicates, they monetise their control over territory, granting protection and resource access in exchange for a share of the profits.
Criminal groups also offer hacking services on a subscription basis, enabling clients – ranging from individuals and groups to state entities – to breach security systems, steal sensitive data or deploy ransomware.
This not only perpetuates the cycle of violence and instability but also entrenches the drug trade within these communities, as they become reliant on revenue generated from opium and methamphetamine production. So we see a complex interplay of local power dynamics and organised crime.
For many years, criminal groups have offered money laundering as a service, creating a new dimension in financial crime. They provide tailored solutions for individuals, businesses and even governments aiming to obscure origins of illicit funds.
The criminals charge for their expertise in navigating complex financial systems. A notable example is the case of the Panama Papers, which exposed how many high-profile individuals and corporations used offshore shell companies in jurisdictions such as Panama to launder money and evade taxes.
Criminal groups also offer hacking services on a subscription basis, enabling clients – ranging from individuals and groups to state entities – to breach security systems, steal sensitive data or deploy ransomware.
This trend allows customers with limited technical skills to engage in sophisticated attacks, effectively broadening the reach of both state and non-state actors.
For instance, Eastern European cybercriminals have been linked to the proliferation of bot farms, which are used to automate attacks and disseminate disinformation at scale, amplifying the impact.
By providing these illicit services, hackers create immunity for their customers, who become difficult to trace and prosecute or, in the case of rogue states, hold accountable.
Manipulation and control
There is a reasonable assessment that the demand for disinformation services is growing among state and non-state actors, reflecting a shift in how information is weaponised for strategic advantage.
If this demand evolves disinformation from a tool of deception into a service available for hire, Australian law enforcement will face complex new challenges. The intertwining of disinformation with organised crime complicates the national security landscape.
As geopolitical tensions rise and digital platforms proliferate, various groups – from rogue states to organised crime syndicates – are increasingly turning to disinformation as a tool for manipulation and control.
This can range from spreading false narratives to create confusion and distract law enforcement, to launching smear campaigns to discredit adversaries.
If this demand evolves disinformation from a tool of deception into a service available for hire, Australian law enforcement will face complex new challenges. The intertwining of disinformation with organised crime complicates the national security landscape.
Australia must evaluate whether existing legislation is sufficient to address the commodification of disinformation. The Operation Kraken case should prompt further investigation into intelligence surrounding criminal fee-for-service disinformation schemes.
A co-ordinated approach involving law enforcement and intelligence agencies is essential to counter the threat.
This article first appeared on the ASPI Strategist website, and is republished under a Creative Commons Licence; you can read the original here
About the Authors
Dr John Coyne is Head of the Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre and Head of Strategic Policing and Law Enforcement at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). John was the inaugural head of ASPI’s Border Security Program; he came to ASPI from the Australian Federal Police, where he worked on transnational serious organised crime, national security, and counter-terrorism. John has worked in intelligence and national security for over 25 years. He has been an intelligence professional at tactical, operational, and strategic levels across military, regulatory, national security and law enforcement organisations.
Liam Auliciems is a research intern for the Statecraft and Intelligence Program at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
Picture © Skorzewiak / Shutterstock
